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the imPACts of internAtionAl 
Aid on the energy seCurity 
of smAll islAnd develoPing 
stAtes (sids): A CAse study of 
tuvAlu
Sarah Hemstock and Roy Smith
Abstract:  Tuvalu is a small island developing state (SID) with least 
developed country (LDC) status. The island has gained international 
attention due to the threat to its land territory as a  result of climate 
change and subsequent sea-level rises. At the United Nations Climate 
Change Conference, held in Copenhagen in December 2009, Tuvalu 
was described as being at serious risk of becoming the first state to be-
come uninhabitable due to the impacts of climate change. The majority 
of climate change scientists agree that a key driver of climate change 
is the burning of fossil fuels, predominantly for energy production. En-
ergy security is multifaceted and connections can be drawn between 
the energy demands of the wealthier, industrialised states and the less 
developed states that are experiencing the detrimental impacts of the 
meeting of these demands. For Tuvalu, the lack of access to adequate, 
affordable, reliable, safe and environmentally benign energy is a severe 
development constraint. Currently, Tuvalu is close to being a totally oil 
dependent economy (83% of primary energy), whose energy security is 
dependent upon foreign aid to ensure its ability to pay international 
oil companies. Costs of all imported goods are exacerbated by its geo-
graphical isolation. This paper analyses the impact of international aid 
on energy security in Tuvalu and comments on the Tuvaluan Govern-
ment’s commitment to 100% renewable energy – “being carbon neutral” 
– by 2020. Although this is a commendable aspiration it is clear that 
even if Tuvalu were to end reliance on fossil fuels it would still be at risk 
of disastrous inundation unless the industrialised states radically reduce 
their own dependency on such fuels and dramatically reduce the global 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions.  
Keywords:  aid, bioenergy, climate change, development, energy 
sector, energy security, natural resource, renewable energy, Tuvalu
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Located 1100 km north of Fiji, Tuvalu consists of nine atolls with 
a total landmass of 25 km2 spread over an exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) of around 750,000km2. The physical characteristics of SIDS 
have enormous consequences for their economy. For example, 
there is no economy of scale for land-based production and due 
to transportation costs by the time any goods for export reach the 
international market they are very expensive. In addition, again 
due to high costs of transportation, any goods that are imported 
are also expensive and subject to disruptions in supply.1 In Tuvalu, 
two inter-island boats service the eight outer-island settlements. 
Tuvalu’s total population is around 11,000 and population density 
is high around 423 people per km2 across Tuvalu as a whole and 
1,610 per km2 in Funafuti.2 The copra market collapsed in 2002, so 
subsistence-farming households are increasingly reliant on remit-
tances from family members working overseas.3 The flat low-lying 
islands of Tuvalu make this tiny nation highly vulnerable to climate 
change impacts. Many NGOs and international organisations have 
run awareness campaigns in Funafuti, and Tuvaluan people appear 
to be alert of climate change issues.4
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From an international perspective the particular environmental 
and development challenges faced by SIDS have been recognised. 
In 1994 the UN convened the first Global Conference on Sustain-
able Development of SIDS. This resulted in the Barbados Action 
Plan with fifteen priority areas, including energy resources. The 
emphasis on the energy sector was designed to both reduce the fi-
nancial burden on fuel importation, and shift the means of energy 
production towards more renewable sources. The text of the Ac-
tion Plan is strong on aspiration but somewhat weaker with regard 
to the specifics and practicalities of implementation. The energy re-
sources aspect of the plan is divided into a Basis for action; National 
action, policies and measures; Regional action and International ac-
tion. The emphasis of the Plan appears to be geared towards creat-
ing a self-serving institutional framework. This criticism has been 
levelled at many aspects of the UN’s Earth Summit process. There 
are Conferences of the Parties for the conventions on both climate 
change and conserving biodiversity, which have created their own 
momentum and a certain element of their targets, are met by simply 
having meetings. For example, the Barbados Action Plan Statement 
on Energy asks national governments to ‘Implement appropriate 
public education and awareness programmes, including consumer 
incentives to promote energy conservation.’5 Most Pacific Island-
ers are very aware of the rise in sea-level associated with climate 
change driven by the use of fossil fuels. They are also aware of the 
need to conserve energy supplies, especially as energy prices have 
risen dramatically. However, raising awareness is not the issue. The 
national action section of the Plan says nothing about the practical 
implementation of renewable energy schemes or any activity that 
would reduce energy poverty or increase access to a secure and sus-
tainable energy source. 
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Development Aid ( International)
Figure 1. Development aid dispersed internationally from all 
donors (total million US$) from 1970 to 2010.
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There has been a marked increase in total development aid since 
2002 (Figure 1). In September 2000, the UN adopted the Millen-
nium Declaration which set a range of development goals. These 
goals (MDGs) included 
1 .  End poverty and hunger; 
2 .  universal education; 
3 .  gender equality; 
4 .  child health; 
5 .  maternal health; 
6 .  combat HIV/AIDS; 
7 .  environmental sustainability and 
8.  global partnership. 
Each of thes  has a targe  to be re ched by 2015. Energy security 
is noticeably absent from this list, although there is an argument 
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that it is something required to underpin all of the above goals and 
targets.
Following the Millennium Summit of 2000, the UN convened 
a  further World Summit in 2005 and a High Level Event on the 
MDGs in 2008 to assess what progress had been made towards 
meeting the various targets. Although there has been some progress 
made in each of the designated areas, most are falling short of the 
desired outcome despite the marked increase in development aid 
shown in Figure 1.
Various donors will have their own priority areas. There are also 
some very vocal critics of the whole development aid agenda, such 
as Dambisa Moyo.6 The main criticisms tend to focus on a depend-
ency culture developing, an increased risk of corruption and mis-
management of funds due to a lack of transparency and accounta-
bility and the general lack of mechanisms to facilitate performance 
feedback and revision of aid effectiveness. Of course these criticisms 
with regards to transparency and mismanagement of funds do not 
only apply to development assistance. There is a growing campaign 
to ensure that funds generated by natural resources and mineral ex-
traction are more open to public scrutiny. The NGO Revenue Watch 
is at the forefront of calling for legislation to improve transparency 
of stock exchange transactions.7 If achieved, this has the potential 
to create a greater sense of the two-way process of wealth creation 
and transfer. The critics of development aid budgets tend to over-
look the overall patterns of trade and cash flows between the more 
and less developed economies. The vast majority of wealth travels 
from the developing to the developed economies.8 In this broader 
context the debate surrounding the amount of aid “given” to the 
developing world creates an alternative perspective. Additionally, in 
industrialised countries tariff protection for agricultural products is 
higher than for manufactured products – around nine times higher 
when aid dispersed began to increase, as per Figure 1.9 Tariff pro-
tection obviously puts many developing nations at a disadvantage 
where they rely on exporting agricultural products as a substantial 
contributor to their GDP. Industrial countries also subsidise their 
agricultural sectors. This has the effect of depressing world prices 
and pre-empting markets, putting developing countries at a severe 
disadvantage. For example, in the 1990s the European Commission 
was spending around €2.7 billion per year making sugar profitable 
cejiss
1/2012
86
for European farmers and shutting out low-cost imports of tropical 
sugar.10 This had deleterious effects on the sugar exports for SIDS 
such as Fiji and Mauritius. Mauritius turned this situation around 
by using bagasse and excess sugar to produce electricity (via cogen-
eration) and bioethanol for use as a petrol substitute. Fiji, however, 
did not follow the example of Mauritius and their export market for 
sugar has yet to recover. Although both are ACP countries and had 
defined export quotas for the EU under the Sugar Protocol of the 
Lomé Convention, prices paid for the quotas were not protected. 
This point reinforces the structural disadvantages and imbalances 
facing many developing economies. 
The example of Tuvalu is a very small entity in the overall glo-
bal political economy of international trade. There are a relatively 
small number of exported goods in comparison to imports and de-
velopment assistance. Some sub-Saharan states have lower per cap-
ita rates of development assistance than the Pacific region, and also 
export significantly higher-value exports of both natural resources 
and export crops. A much higher percentage of Tuvalu’s GDP is in 
the form of development assistance in comparison to the majority 
of sub-Saharan states. This raises questions regarding the effective-
ness of aid programmes in the Pacific region if a higher proportion 
of aid is being directed here, yet there appear to be relatively poor 
levels of improvement in the targeted areas. In addition to the dis-
parities in the amount of aid given to sub-Saharan and Pacific Is-
land states there is also a qualitative difference. For the sub-Saharan 
states the emphasis tends to be on basic needs such as food security 
and health. Whereas in Tuvalu and other Pacific Island states the 
emphasis is more on developing infrastructure and supporting the 
bureaucracy and delivery of government services. 
The following section examines the position of energy as a donor 
priority in relation to development assistance for broader economic 
infrastructure. 
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Figure 2. Development aid committed for economic infra-
structure and services
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The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
sector category Economic Infrastructure and Services includes eco-
nomic infrastructure, transport and storage, communications, 
energy, banking and finance, business and other services. From 
1990 to 2009, aid committed for Economic Infrastructure and Serv-
ices accounted for between 29% (in 1991) and 12% (in 2005) of total 
international aid. From 1990–2009, aid committed for Energy has 
accounted for between 11% (in 1991) and 4% (in 2005) of total in-
ternational aid.11 In recent years, much of the aid available for en-
ergy services has been for policy development. So in real terms the 
proportion of aid for practical sustainable energy projects, which 
deliver energy services to the rural poor, has declined markedly. As 
the Tuvalu case study shows much of the multilateral aid money 
available for energy projects in the decade of 1995–2005 was spent 
on energy policy. Yu and Taplin have argued that energy security 
issues have not been prioritised with a resulting negative impact on 
‘social and economic development and environmental protection.’12 
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The current emphasis of multilateral overseas development as-
sistance (ODA) on energy policy development owes much to the 
fact that in the 1990s development aid related research and anal-
ysis highlighted the lack of consensus and ineffectiveness of past 
aid programmes and espoused the virtues of policy development. 
For example, a World Bank assessment concludes: ‘policy-based aid 
should be provided to nurture policy reform in credible reformers.’13 
This is a welcome development but remains meaningless unless it 
results in a marked improvement in the implementation of devel-
opment aid projects. Where aid is spent in accordance with policy, 
progress is usually made. However, as the following analysis shows, 
aid is not always spent in accordance with policy. 
A comprehensive National Energy Policy Framework (including 
Strategies and Activities) was developed by the Ministry of Works 
and Energy, Government of Tuvalu and National Workgroup, 
as part of the Pacific Islands Energy Policies and Strategic Action 
Project.14 This project was facilitated regionally by SOPAC (from 
2003 to 2006), and cost over $1,800,000 (USD). Funding agencies 
included UNDP-GEF and the Government of Denmark via a part-
nership between the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and the Eu-
ropean Union Energy Initiative for Poverty Eradication for Sustain-
able Development (EUEI).  
Prior to this, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
2002, Pacific Island Countries (PICs) launched a regional energy sec-
tor umbrella initiative: Pacific Islands Energy for Sustainable Devel-
opment (PIESD). The objectives of this initiative were aligned with 
the objectives of the Pacific Islands Energy Policy and Plan (PIEPP) 
namely: ‘i) Increased availability of adequate, affordable and environ-
mentally sound energy for the sustainable development of all Pacific 
islanders; and ii) Accelerated transfer and adoption of clean and re-
newable energy technologies in the Pacific.’15 These regional initia-
tives provided a broad energy policy framework, which PIEPSAP de-
veloped into national energy policy, strategies & activities. The Pacific 
Islands Greenhouse Gas Abatement through the Renewable Energy 
Project (PIGGAREP), which is currently being implemented, was de-
signed as a practical follow-up to the PIEPP & PIEPSAP initiatives.16 
However, for many Pacific SIDS the efforts to devise appropriate en-
ergy policies, strategies and activities have yielded few results as far 
as PIEPP objectives are concerned re: adoption of renewable energy 
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sources and energy efficiency initiatives, and a move away from inef-
ficient diesel generation technology.
The example of Tuvalu (section 3) highlights the disparities be-
tween the intentions of energy policy development and the actual 
implementation of energy provision on the ground. The reasons 
for this are a combination of international and external factors. At 
the local level politicians and most of the general population in the 
Pacific Island states are aware of the effects of climate change and 
the need for sustainable development. However, donors are not 
necessarily funding projects that are in line with national develop-
ment priorities. This situation is particularly true for Tuvalu’s ener-
gy policy and recent energy sector infrastructure development. For 
example, in 2004/5 JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) 
implemented three 180 diesel electricity generators. During the 
project planning phase discussions were held with NGOs, Govern-
ment of Tuvalu (GoT) and engineers from Mitsubishi and DiNipon, 
who were the implementing agencies.17 NGOs and GoT representa-
tives lobbied for the generators to be able to run on coconut oil, but 
were told that the equipment required to do this was too expensive. 
As a result of this, in 2011 JICA were still paying for the fossil fuel 
to run the generators at a cost of one million (USD) per year.18 This 
is a contentious issue as coconut oil biodiesel is an economically, 
culturally and environmentally sustainable fuel source for Tuvalu.19
Table 1. Economic overview of Tuvalu
Year 2000 2003 2005 2008
GDP: Gross Domestic Product (million current US$) 12 - 25 32
Development aid contribution to GDP (million US$) 4 6 9 16
Development aid as a % of GDP 33 - 36 50
GNI: Gross National Income per capita (current US$) 1204 - 2383 3213
Available average income per capita (US$) 806 - 1525 1607
Exports (million US$) - 0.15 0.1 0.1
Imports (million US$) - 24 18.5 26
Sources: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crname=Tuvalu 
OECD international development statistical database (http://stats.
oecd.org/qwids) and Government of Tuvalu20
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Tuvalu’s economy is small, disjointed and extremely susceptible 
to external economic influences such as changes in oil prices. These 
factors have led to dependence on outside development assistance 
and a disregard of financial management. Since the local currency 
is the Australian Dollar (AUS$), the Government of Tuvalu cannot 
effectively use monetary policy as a tool for fiscal management. In 
addition, changes in exchange rates affect externally generated rev-
enue such as remittances from Tuvaluan seafarers working over-
seas. The subsistence economic sector has been declining steadily, 
by around 0.8% per annum and currently represents around 5% of 
GDP.21 Declining subsistence production is part of broader trends 
such as the growing importance of cash in meeting daily needs; de-
clining outer island populations (excluding Funafuti and Vaitupu) 
and shifting demographics. This is because the ‘economically active 
population’ (aged 15–54) are leaving the outer islands to find paid 
jobs to support an increasing ‘dependent’ population of young and 
old.22 
Currently foodstuffs represent around 25% of Tuvalu’s imports 
and fossil fuels around 19%. Imports of fossil fuels are a major drain 
on foreign exchange resources and supply remains vulnerable to 
disruptions, especially in outer-islands due to transportation dif-
ficulties.23
Across Tuvalu, mode and average income per day ranges from 
$1.6 to $4.0 (USD) (Table 1), so the vast majority of people are living 
in energy poverty; 76% of those in the lowest income deciles live 
on the outer islands. 23% of the total population of the outer is-
lands live on less than $1 (USD) per day. Household expenditure on 
domestic energy services currently represents 21% of total current 
household income on outer islands, and those in the lowest income 
deciles on Funafuti in theory would need to spend 61% of their total 
income to buy average level energy services. On the outer islands, 
diesel electricity generation is limited to between 12 and 18 hours 
a day.  Electricity use in Funafuti is 6 to 7 times higher than on the 
outer islands combined. There is severe disparity in energy service 
provision between Funafuti and outer-islands.24 In addition, many 
people in Funafuti cannot afford to use electricity, despite the in-
troduction of a “life-line” tariff in 2008.25 
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Figure 3. Development aid dispersed to Tuvalu from all do-
nors (total million US$) from 1990 to 2009
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Tuvalu received $16.2 million (USD) in development aid pay-
ments in 2008, which accounts for half of its GDP (Table 1 and 
Figure 3). From 2003-2007 JICA provided $9 million (AUS$) for the 
installation of three 600kW diesel electricity generators, a new grid 
and connections to all houses in Funafuti. Since 2006 JICA have 
provided between one and two million (AUS$) to pay for diesel for 
the generators.
Bilateral donors, such as RoC-Taiwan, JICA, New Zealand Aid, 
AusAid and Canada Aid have tended to fund GoT or community 
requested “concrete” projects and infrastructure. In contrast to 
this, over the past decade, regional and international organisa-
tions (such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), South Pacific Applied Geo-
sciences Commission (SOPAC), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
(PIFS), South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), 
(etc) which all rely on multilateral aid), appear to have focused their 
development assistance on the formulation of policy frameworks 
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and energy policy development. Since 1999, energy policy efforts 
have had some degree of coordination via the regional organisation 
CROP – Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific Energy 
Working Group.
Analysis  of Tuvalu’s  Energy Sector
Figure 4 shows that in 2004, the total energy consumption was 
4.6 ktoe, with oil accounting for 3.8 ktoe (82%) and biomass for 0.8 
ktoe (18% of the total primary energy consumption.26 This includes 
diesel charged by the two inter-island vessels (Nivaga II and Manu 
Folau) in Suva, Fiji. Annual energy consumption in 2004 was ap-
proximately 0.4 ktoe per capita.
By 2007, the total energy consumption had increased to 5.8 ktoe, 
with oil accounting for 4.8 ktoe (83%), biomass for 0.8 ktoe (14%) 
and solar 0.1 ktoe (2%) (Figure 1). Annual energy consumption in 
2007 was approximately 0.5 toe per capita.27 The kerosene use of 
1045 toe in 2007 accounts for refuelling of the Air Pacific plane in 
Funafuti. From 2004 to 2007, petrol use decreased by 13% (Figure 
1). This is mainly due to the impact of increased retail fuel prices. 
This has resulted in an increased use of “traditional” fishing canoes, 
rather than a large reduction in road vehicle use. The use of toddy 
ethanol to fuel small fishing boats could provide a viable role for 
toddy production.28
In 2004, a  total of 1170 toe (36% of total national energy con-
sumption) was used for domestic purposes, 91% of it (1070 toe) was 
used for cooking & boiling water. Biomass provided 64% (746 toe) 
of total domestic energy use, kerosene 23% (263 toe), electricity 10% 
(118 toe), and LPG 4% (43 toe). Solar energy provided 0.6 toe mainly 
for lighting and electrical appliances. These values have been esti-
mated from in-country survey.29 By 2007, a total of 1383 toe (25% of 
total national energy consumption) was used for domestic purpos-
es, 88% of it (1213 toe) was for cooking and boiling water. Biomass 
provided 54% (746 toe) of total domestic energy use, kerosene 29% 
(401 toe), electricity 14% (193 toe), and LPG 3% (41 toe). Solar en-
ergy provided 0.6 toe mainly for lighting and electrical appliances 
(on Nuilakita the only electricity source is solar pv). These values 
have been estimated from in-country survey.30 However, despite 
these increases in primary energy, there is relatively little impact 
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for those living on outer-islands, who remain up to 80% biomass 
energy dependent. 
Figure 4. A comparison of primary energy supply in Tuvalu for 
2004 and 2007
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Tuvalu is currently importing the vast majority of its energy 
(83%) in the form of fossil fuel, which is a major drain on foreign 
exchange resources. Without the annual AUS$2 million subsidy 
from JICA, electricity production on Funafuti would be economi-
cally unsustainable. Tuvalu’s small size, remoteness, diseconomies 
of scale and the manner in which electricity tariffs are structured all 
contribute to an over-reliance on external aid programmes.32  Obvi-
ously, in order for Tuvalu to improve its energy security situation, it 
must use its indigenous energy resources such as biomass, solar and 
wind.33 However, as with fossil fuel technologies, renewable energy 
technologies (RETs) will require the capital costs of equipment to 
be covered by donor agencies.
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Renewable Energy Technology Implementation 
(Tuvalu)
Tuvalu has had experience with renewable energy technologies (ex-
cluding traditional uses of biomass energy) since the early 1980s when 
12v stand-alone solar photovoltaic (pv) systems were installed for 
domestic use. These systems ran well initially, but fell into disrepair 
when replacement components were needed. A “pay-to-hire” mecha-
nism was implemented at the same time as the pv systems, with some 
families providing 100 coconuts per month for use of their system. 
However, these payments did not produce the revenue required to 
buy replacement components. In addition, safe disposal of spent bat-
teries from solar systems proved problematic and lessons have been 
learnt from this. For example, the NGO Alofa Tuvalu is currently im-
plementing low-tech domestic energy systems, such as biogas, along 
with extensive training for users so that repair and maintenance of 
systems can be carried out on site using available materials. In addi-
tion, new solar installations are grid connected and run by Tuvalu 
Electricity Corporation.34 Tuvalu’s capacity for wind generation is 
currently being assessed. For these recent renewable energy installa-
tions various approaches have been taken to ensure long-term sus-
tainability of such as: capacity building via training and strengthen-
ing service provision; tariff setting; community involvement from the 
outset; appropriate technology which does not require the continuing 
intervention of foreign agency “Technical Assistance;” the build-up of 
a  critical mass of similar apparatus throughout Tuvalu, so systems 
maintenance is cost effective; an integrated multi-disciplinary and 
multi-sector approach which builds on Tuvalu’s existing infrastruc-
ture and institutions for service provision; and rigorous assessment 
of the natural resource base which can be sustainably accessed and 
harvested for use in the case of biomass energy projects. 
Biomass is a fuel that people are familiar with and currently pro-
vides 64% of energy to the domestic sector.35 However, although 
continued use of traditional biomass will provide for basic needs, it 
will not solve the problem of providing the modern energy services 
required for economic growth and improved living standards.  It is 
apparent that the modernisation of biomass energy use, via biogas, 
biodiesel and gasification, will involve some social and cultural chang-
es. In addition further political and techno-economic changes will be 
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required for successful implementation of the biomass energy initia-
tives discussed. The successful implementation of sustainable modern 
biomass energy schemes is certainly a major, but achievable, challenge 
for Tuvalu. The following table lists identified constraining factors for 
such schemes, plus strategies to overcome these constraints.   
Box 1. Constraints on renewable energy technology adop-
tion and strategies to overcome the constraints
Constraints Strategy
Lack of appropriate 
technology selection – 
mainly due to a reliance 
on outside aid which 
has dictated technology 
options.
Technology selection must follow energy policy strategies 
and activities. Aid for energy applications must take into 
account PIGGAREP, PICCAP, PIREP & PIEPSAP recommen-
dations and GoT Energy Policy/Strategy. Only appropriate 
and established RET’s should be implemented. 
An international agreement signed by all UN members and 
bilateral funders, such as RoC Taiwan, which states that 
all funded projects will be in accordance with national and 
regional policy.
Lack of technical 
expertise and instituti-
onal structure to plan, 
manage and maintain RE 
programs. 
Training is the key to this barrier. Any RE intervention must 
have an associated training program. In addition, Tuvalu’s 
existing facilities (TMTI, Amatuku) should be strengthened 
to provide ongoing training & back-up. All interventions 
should have an agreed management & economic plan, 
possibly with the set-up of a dedicated or strengthening of 
an existing (Tuvalu Electricity Corporation) service provider, 
as part of any project exit strategy.
Ineffective long-term 
management.
To be effective training must be given in organisational 
structure & accountability. A service provider needs to be 
set-up for any energy services. Dedicated specialist units 
with technical & financial expertise would be most benefi-
cial. Regional accountability & provision of expertise may 
also be a useful role for existing regional institutions.
Misguided institutional 
mechanisms – including 
badly targeted subsidies 
and legislation which 
limits consumer choice 
(e.g. JICA fossil fuel sub-
sidy; Funafuti electricity 
regulation – all electricity 
use has to be via con-
nection to TEC; diesel 
fuel is duty and tax free 
for power generation; 
subsidised TEC tariffs.
Any legislation should at least provide a level playing field for 
all sources of energy. RET’s reduce pollution & GHG emissions 
firstly by replacing polluting fossil fuels & secondly as they are 
zero net carbon emitters when used sustainably. Using bioe-
nergy would revitalise Tuvalu’s copra industry and help reach 
GHG commitments. It therefore makes sense for Tuvalu to 
introduce institutional mechanisms which favour renewables. 
Assisting with subsidy targeting and energy related legislation 
is a clear role for existing regional institutions. Although a Na-
tional Energy Strategic Plan has been developed via PIEPSAP/
PIREP, no help with existing legislation or targeting incentives 
has been given in order to alleviate RET implementation diffi-
culties related to existing legislation and subsidies. 
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Requirement for com-
plex project proposals 
by financing institutions 
and lack of awareness of 
available funding. 
Reduce complexity. Additional training and support for 
TANGO (Tuvalu Association of NGO’s), TEC and GoT. 
Engage the skills of international funding institutions and 
NGOs to help prepare funding requests. An internet based 
network/forum to provide further information on available 
funding. A business co-ordinator/ business development 
centre to appropriate funds for projects. 
These are all roles for existing regional institutions.
Focus of funding organi-
sations on “market deve-
lopment” and “policy.”
Re-focus on practical installation of RETs. The “market” will 
never be self-sustaining in a SIDS such as Tuvalu as there 
is no economy of scale, no export products and US$2 mode 
and US$4 median income per day. Tuvalu’s energy sector is 
aid dependent and will remain so for the foreseeable future. 
Development of energy policy which supports RET imple-
mentation is pointless unless funders agree to follow it.
Discussion and Conclusions
To assess the final outcomes of this “policy-based” multilateral ap-
proach to development aid for energy, a future analysis of SIDS en-
ergy sectors will be required. However, it is apparent at this stage 
that there has been no success in increasing the renewable energy 
contribution to the national energy budget of Tuvalu, nor have 
there been any effective moves towards more efficient generation 
or end-use technologies. In addition, in contrast to the rhetoric sur-
rounding the “policy-based” approach, Woods (et al) showed that 
successful RET implementation in SIDS was often due to the skill 
and enthusiasm of a few individuals, focused NGOs and entrepre-
neurs, rather than regional strategies, reports, feasibility studies 
and policy implementation.36 
Tuvalu’s decision-makers are aware of the value and potential of 
Tuvalu’s indigenous energy resources. Unfortunately, they do not 
control the capital or have the capacity to capitalise on indigenous 
resources as a means of sustainable energy provision.37 At the UN-
FCC Cop16/CMP6 (Bangkok, July 2009), the then Minister for Pub-
lic Utilities and Industry, the Hon. Kausea Natano, declared: ‘We 
look forward to the day when our nation offers an example to all 
– powered entirely by natural resources such as the sun and the 
wind,’ and set a goal of having all Tuvalu’s energy from renewable 
resources by 2020. Clearly, there is political backing of renewable 
energy technologies, at least intellectually. In practice however, the 
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picture is very different as per Figure 4. Tuvalu’s balance of pay-
ments, and resulting dependency on overseas aid programmes, 
makes it very difficult to translate the well-intentioned aspirations 
of a  fossil fuel-free future into a  reality. Failures are not due to 
a lack of political will, and successes (though limited) are not due to 
policy formulation. Tuvalu’s energy security is aid dependent – the 
majority of recent energy sector infrastructure has been paid for 
by external development aid. Subsidies which encourage the use of 
fossil fuels are also currently in place, such as the JICA donation to 
cover fuel costs of diesel for electricity generation. To improve en-
ergy security, aid has to be spent in line with needs, and with a view 
towards sustainability. In addition, multilaterally funded regional 
efforts to encourage renewables have previously placed much of 
their emphasis on policy and “market development” rather than 
practical help and actual RET installations, such as the e8 (which 
comprises ten leading electricity companies from the G8 countries) 
40 kW grid-connected solar system in Funafuti.38 
A pro-active role for existing regional institutions would be to as-
sist with subsidy targeting and energy related legislation. Although 
a National Energy Strategic Plan has already been developed for Tu-
valu via PIEPSAP, no help with existing legislation or targeting in-
centives has been given in order to alleviate policy implementation 
difficulties related to existing legislation. This oversight appears 
to indicate that there are inherent difficulties in applying relevant 
one-size fits all policy/strategic actions by regional organisations at 
a regional level. Since, although the National Strategic Energy Plan 
was targeted specifically at Tuvalu’s needs, it did not account for 
Tuvalu’s specific existing legislative and policy frameworks.
Despite the activity of the “alphabet-soup” of organisations and 
multilateral programmes active in the region, there is little evi-
dence of successful practical grassroots initiatives, which actually 
improve access to renewable, or even just plain affordable, energy 
service provision for the rural poor of Tuvalu and other Pacific re-
gion SIDs. Currently, on a regional basis, it may be a case of “too 
many cooks spoil the broth,” rather than “many hands make light 
work.” Very little funding appears to filter down to actual practical 
initiatives. For example, PIGGAREP (the practical regional follow-
up to the PIEPP and PIEPSAP), has only committed $16.2 million 
(USD) to projects that will directly increase RET generation capacity 
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and energy security out of a total budget of $33.3 million (USD).39 
Conversely, much time and effort goes into preparing national and 
regional reports, strategies and feasibility studies, and study after 
study appears to be generated with no apparent intention of follow-
ing through on the findings. The streamlining of regional organisa-
tions and multilateral programmes appears to be necessary to allow 
limited development funds to be spent on practical solutions to en-
ergy security and the alleviation of energy poverty, rather than on 
allowing organisations to “feed themselves” by generating reports 
and feasibility studies. In addition, for countries such as Tuvalu, 
with limited capacity, the application processes which need to be 
completed in order to access funds are so torturously complicated 
that the funding organisations need to send a costly technical as-
sistant to help with the application. 
However, the development of regional and international stream-
lined support will be necessary to establish technical support and 
capacity to underpin the successful development of practical bio-
mass energy projects and programmes if Tuvalu is going to achieve 
its carbon neutral target by 2020. This will be necessary in order to:
1 .  Promote the development of clusters of projects based 
around similar production, supply and conversion pathways 
with the aim of developing entrepreneurial capacity to carry 
out maintenance, repair and development of systems.
2 .  Establish academic research and development programmes 
in Universities (preferably at local level utilising in-country 
campuses) and linkages with international groups and the 
private sector already involved in bio-energy research and 
development in order to avoid re-inventing the wheel.
3 .  Ensure that multilateral and bilateral aid for the energy sec-
tor is in line with national energy policy and legislation.
The above discussion has highlighted a key element of the power 
dynamics that underpin international aid programmes. Much of 
the rhetoric surrounding such programmes is about raising aware-
ness and community education agendas, yet in many instances 
local communities are fully aware of the problems they are facing 
and have a good sense of the measures required to address these 
problems. Tuvalu gained international attention when GoT repre-
sentatives highlighted the extent and immediacy of the threat to 
low-lying atoll states at the UNFCC COP15 meeting in Copenhagen 
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in 2009.40 GoT officials and the wider Tuvaluan community are not 
in need of a further set of workshops to raise awareness relating to 
the issue of climate change. They need direct practical assistance 
to reduce their reliance on imported fossil fuel. However, even if 
such plans were implemented this in itself would not significantly 
reduce the threat of sea-level rise. Tuvalu’s contribution to global 
greenhouse gas emissions is miniscule when compared to the ma-
jor industrialised economies. Without a major, meaningful com-
mitment and resulting action to reduce such emissions, whatever 
policies Tuvalu attempts to enact will have little practical impact.  
If past RET experience in the region is going to be built upon, and 
lessons learned, it is evident that a streamlined programme (with 
simple funding application requirements) for developing practical 
regional and national RET initiatives is required to assist the proc-
ess of successful project development and implementation. This 
will also require significant community, local political and focused 
practical support. As there is no silver bullet solution to implement-
ing RET strategies, each project should be developed and assessed 
on a case-by-case basis.41
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